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ABSTRACT
Online advertising is progressively moving towards a programmatic
model in which ads are matched to actual interests of individuals
collected as they browse the web. Leing the huge debate around
privacy aside, a very important question in this area, for which lile
is known, is: How much do advertisers pay to reach an individual?
In this study, we develop a rst of its kind methodology for
computing exactly that – the price paid for a web user by the ad
ecosystem – and we do that in real time. Our approach is based
on tapping on the Real Time Bidding (RTB) protocol to collect
cleartext and encrypted prices for winning bids paid by advertisers
in order to place targeted ads. Our main technical contribution is a
method for tallying winning bids even when they are encrypted.
We achieve this by training a model using as ground truth prices
obtained by running our own “probe” ad-campaigns. We design our
methodology through a browser extension and a back-end server
that provides it with fresh models for encrypted bids. We validate
our methodology using a one year long trace of 1600 mobile users
and demonstrate that it can estimate a user’s advertising worth
with more than 82% accuracy.
1 INTRODUCTION
In today’s data-driven economy, the amount of user data an IT com-
pany holds has a direct and non-trivial contribution to its overall
market valuation [73]. Digital advertising is the most important
means of monetizing such user data. It grew to $194.6 billion in
2016 [75] of which $108 billion were due to mobile advertising. In
fact, more and more companies rush to participate in this rapidly
growing advertising business either as advertisers, ad-exchanges
(ADXs), demand-side platforms (DSPs), data management platforms
(DMPs), or all of the above. For these companies to increase their
market share, they need to deliver more eective and highly tar-
geted advertisements. A way to achieve this is through program-
matic instantaneous auctions. An important enabler for this kind
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of auctions is the Real-Time Bidding (RTB) protocol for transact-
ing digital display ads in real time. RTB has been growing with
an annual rate of 128% [80], and currently accounts for 74% of
programmatically purchased advertising. In US alone it created a
revenue of $8.7 billion in 2016 [8].
Consequently, the collection of user personal data has become
more aggressive and sometimes even intrusive [29, 33], raising a
huge public debate around the tradeos between (i) innovation
in advertising and marketing, and (ii) basic civil rights regarding
privacy and personal data protection [51, 55]. ese increasing pri-
vacy concerns, drew the aention of a signicant body of research,
which studied users’ privacy loss in conjunction to existing user
tracking techniques [1, 17, 21, 52, 60], and proposed various de-
fence mechanisms to users [59, 64, 65]. Still, there is an outstanding
question that remains unaddressed by the related work in the area.
is question concerns transparency and is the following: Based on
the exposed user personal data, how much do advertisers pay to reach
an individual?
Despite the importance of this question, it is surprising how lile
is known about it. ere exist several reports about the average
revenue per user (ARPU) from online advertising [13, 30, 67], but
ARPU, as its name suggests, is just an average. It can be calculated
by dividing the total revenue of a company by the number of its
monthly active users. Computing the revenue per individual user
is a completely dierent maer for which very limited work is
available.
In particular, the FDVT [14] browser extension can estimate
the value of an individual user for Facebook, by tapping on the
platform’s ad-planner. Another important prior work [62] leverages
similarly the RTB protocol and specically its nal stage, where the
winning bidder (advertiser) gets notied about the auction’s charge
price per delivered impression. ese charge prices were initially
transmied in cleartext and focused solely on them. However, more
and more advertising companies use encryption to reduce the risk
of tampering, falsication or monitoring from competitors. is
trend renders that method inapplicable for the current and future ad
ecosystem, whose majority of companies will deploy charge price
encryption. In contrast to these works, our present method takes
into account all the web activity of a user (not only on Facebook),
and all RTB trac, i.e., both cleartext and encrypted prices.
In this paper, our motivation is to enhance transparency in digital
advertising and shed light on pricing dynamics in its personal data-
driven ecosystem. erefore, we develop and evaluate a rst of its
kind methodology for enabling end-users to estimate in real time
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their actual cost for advertisers, even when the laer encrypt the
prices they pay. Designed as a browser extension, our method can
tally winning bids for ads shown to a user and display the resulting
amount as she moves from site to site in real time.
In summary, we make the following main contributions:
(1) We propose the rst to our knowledge holistic methodology to
calculate the overall cost of a user for the RTB ad ecosystem,
using both encrypted and cleartext price notications from RTB-
based auctions.
(2) We study the feasibility and eciency of our proposed method
by analyzing a year-long weblog of 1600 real mobile users. Ad-
ditionally, we design and perform an aordable (a few hun-
dred dollars cost) 2-phase real world ad-campaign targeting
ad-exchanges delivering cleartext and encrypted prices in or-
der to enhance the real-users’ extracted prices. We show that
even with a handful of features extracted from the ad-campaign,
our methodology achieves an accuracy > 82%. e resulting
ARPU is ∼55% higher than that computed based on cleartext
RTB prices alone. Our ndings challenge the related work’s
basic assumption [62] that encrypted and plain text prices are
similar (we found encrypted prices to be ∼1.7× higher). Finally,
we validate our methodology by comparing our average esti-
mated user cost with the reported per user revenue of major
advertising companies.
(3) Using lessons from the study, we design a system where the
users, by using a Chrome browser extension, can estimate in
real-time, in a privacy-preserving fashion on the client side, the
overall cost advertisers pay for them based on their exposed per-
sonal information. In addition, they can also contribute anony-
mously their impression charge prices to a centralized platform
for further research.
Paper Organization. Section 2 summarizes various key concepts
of the RTB ecosystem and presents the main challenge and moti-
vation of our work. Section 3 provides a high-level overview of
our novel methodology and our price modeling engine. Section 4
presents an analysis of the dataset we use to bootstrap our modeling
of encrypted prices. Section 5 presents in detail the eort to model
RTB charge prices by executing probing ad-campaigns. ese cam-
paigns provide ground-truth data, which is used to train a machine
learning classier that can estimate encrypted prices in real-time
at the browser of a user. Section 6 puts all the pieces together and
presents results on the overall monetary cost for displaying ads
to users. Section 7 covers related work while Section 8 discuses
various aspects of our work and concludes the paper.
2 BACKGROUND ON RTB
RTB accounts for 74% of programmatically purchased advertising,
reaching a total revenue of $8.7 billion in US [8], allowing advertis-
ers to evaluate the collected data of a given user at real-time and bid
for an ad-slot in the user’s display. Next, we briey cover the most
important aspects of RTB auctions, key entities involved (§ 2.1),
and how they are relevant to our study (§ 2.2).
2.1 e key players
As it can be seen in Figure 1, the key roles of the RTB ecosystem
include the Advertiser, Publisher, DSP, Ad-exchange, and SSP, which
User Tracking
(3) Bid request, 
User info
Data Hub:
DMP, Data Broker, 
etc.
(4) Retrieve user interests, 
geolocation, behavior
SSP
(2) Ad request
(1) User visits 
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webpage
(5) Place bids
DSP
(7) “charge price” and 
“impression rendered” notification
(6) Winner’s impression 
delivery
Ad-
slot
ADX
User
Figure 1: High level overview of theRTB ecosystem. Several entities
interact with each other, exchanging user’s personal data before it
is nally converted to money.
interact with each other in several ways [4]. Note that it is very
common for some (large) companies to play simultaneously dier-
ent roles even inside the same auction (e.g. Google’s DoubleClick
Bid Manager [28] and DoubleClick for Publishers [23].
Publisher: (e.g., CNN.com) is the owner of a website, where users
browse for content and receive ads (step 1). Each time a user visits
the website, an auction takes place for each available ad slot. e
ad impression of the winning advertiser is nally displayed in each
auctioned slot of the website.
Advertiser: is the buyer of a website’s ad slots. e advertiser cre-
ates ad campaigns and denes the audience that has to be targeted
according to his marketing objectives, budgets, strategies, etc. In
each auction, the one with the highest bid wins the ad slot and
places its impression on the screen of the website’s visitor.
Supply-Side Platform (SSP): is an agency platform, which en-
ables publishers to manage their inventory of available ad slots and
their pricing, allocate ad impressions from dierent channels (e.g.
RTB or backll in case of unsold inventory [46]) and receive rev-
enue1. SSP is also responsible for interfacing the publisher’s side to
multiple ad-exchanges (step 2) and aggregate/manage publisher’s
connections with multiple ad networks and buyers. In addition,
by using web beacons and cookie synchronization, SSPs perform
user tracking in order to beer congure their ad slots’ pricing
and achieve as many re-targeting ads as possible and thus higher
bids [43]. Popular vendors selling SSP technology are OpenX, Pub-
Matic, Rubicon Project, Right Media.
Ad-exchange (ADX): is a digital, real-time marketplace that, sim-
ilarly to a stock exchange, enables advertisers and publishers to
buy and sell advertising space through RTB-based auctions. ADX
is responsible for hosting an RTB-based auction and distribute the
ad requests along with user information it owns (i.e. browsing
history, demographics, location, cookie-related info) among all the
interested auction participants (step 3).
Typically these auctions follow the second higher price model
(i.e. Vickrey auctions) [79], thus, the charge price for the winner
of the slot is the second highest submied. Aer the auction, the
winning impression is served to the user’s display within 100 ms of
the initiating call (step 6) and the winning bidder is notied about
1Publishers can also interface directly with ADXs and handle their inventory on their
own.
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Winning Price Notication URLs
(A) cpp.imp.mpx.mopub.com/imp?ad domain=amazon.es&
ads creative id=ID&bid price=0.99&bidder id=ID&…
&bidder name=..&charge price=0.95&country=..&…
&currency=USD&latency=0.116&mopub id=ID&pub name=..
(B) tags.mathtag.com/notify/js?exch=ruc&…
&price=B6A3F3C19F50C7FD&…
&3pck=hp%3A%2F%2Fbeacon-eu2.rubiconproject.com%2F
beacon%2Ft%2Fce48666c-6eb4-46db-b0e9-6f4155eb557d%2F
(C) adserver-ir-p.mythings.com/ads/admainrtb.aspx?googid=ID&..
&width=300&height=250&…&cmpid=ID&gid=ID&mcpm=60&…
rtbwinprice=VLwbi4K21KFAAAm2ziqnOS O5oNkFuuJw&..
Table 1: Examples of (A) cleartext, (B, C) encrypted RTB price noti-
cations. “ID” is typically a hexadecimal number.
the nal charge price. Popular ad-exchanges include: DoubleClick,
MoPub, and OpenX.
Demand-Side Platform (DSP): is an agency platform, which em-
ploys decision engines with sophisticated audience targeting and
optimization algorithms aiming to help advertisers buy the best-
matched ad slots from ADXs in a simple, convenient and unied
way. DSPs retrieve and process user data from several sources (step
4) such as ADXs, Data Hubs, etc. e result of this processing is
translated to a decision in practice: How much is it worth to bid for
an ad slot for this user, if any? If the visitor’s prole matches the
audience the advertiser has focused his ad-campaign on, the DSP
will submit to the ADX the impression and a bid in CPM (cost per
1000 impressions [38], typically in USD or Euro) on behalf of the ad-
vertiser (step 5). Popular DSPs are MediaMath, Criteo, DoubleClick,
AppNexus and Invite Media.
User Data Hub, Data Exchange Platform (DXP): is a central-
ized data warehouse such as a DataManagement Platform (DMP) [9,
45] or a Data Broker [49] which aggregates, cleans, analyzes and
maintains user private data such as demographics, device nger-
prints, interests, online and oine contextual and behavioral in-
formation [40, 41]. ese user data are typically aggregated in two
formats: 1) a full, audience user prole for oine analytics and data
mining, 2) a run-time user prole, optimized for real-time requests
such as RTB queries from DSPs, before submiing their bids to
ADXs [18, 42] (step 4).
Such user proles are sold to ad entities [5] because they increase
the value of an RTB inventory by enabling a more behavioral-
targeted advertising (2.7× more eective than non-targeted adver-
tising [6, 82]). In fact, Data Hubs are considered the core component
of the digital ad-ecosystem as they perform the aribution and la-
beling of users’ data and create groups, namely audience segments,
which are useful (i) to the publishers for their customer under-
standing, (ii) to the SSPs for retrieving more re-targeted ads and
(iii) to the DSPs for feeding their bid decision engines. Further,
quality scores are impartially assigned to users’ private data based
on the success of ad-campaigns they were used, thus driving the
bid prices of future ad-campaigns. Notable DXPs are Turn, Adobe,
Krux, Bluekai, Lotame.
2.2 RTB price notication channel
When an ADX selects the winning bid of an auction, the corre-
sponding bidder must be notied about its win to log the successful
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entry and the price to be paid to the ADX. One could implement
this notication in two ways: (i) with a server-to-server message
between ADX and DSP, (ii) with a notication message conjoined
with the price, passed through the user’s browser as a call-back to
the DSP.
e rst option is straightforward and tamper-proof; no one can
modify or block these messages, allowing companies to ensure that
their logs are fully synced at any time. In addition, DSPs can hide
information about the transactions, the purchased ad-slots and the
prices paid from the prying eyes of competitors. However, DSPs
do not have any indication of the delivery of each ad, in order to
inform their campaigns and budget.
Instead, the second option not only can ensure the DSP that the
winning impression was indeed delivered (the callback is red soon
aer the impression is rendered on the user’s device), but also gives
the opportunity to drop a cookie on the user’s device. erefore,
the second option is the dominant one in the current market: the
ADX piggybacks a notication URL (nURL) in the ad-response,
which delivers to the user the winning impression and the ad (steps
6 and 7 in Figure 1). is nURL includes basically the winning
DSP’s domain, the charge price, the impression ID, the auction ID
and other relevant logistics (see Table 1 for some examples). In
this present work, we study such nURLs and the prices embedded
in them, as well as how they associate with the users’ browsing
behavior and other personal information.
2.3 Encrypted vs. cleartext prices
Although in the early years of RTB, all charge prices in nURLs
were in cleartext, we see that nowadays more and more companies
deliver charge prices in encrypted form (see examples in Table 1).
While cleartext prices captured at the user’s browser can be easily
tallied to estimate the total cleartext cost, the same does not apply
for the encrypted prices. e popular 28-byte encryption scheme
companies use cannot be easily broken [26].
Previous studies [62] assumed that encrypted prices follow the
same distribution as cleartext ones. Indeed, one may argue that the
price encryption is just to avoid tampering of reported prices, so
encrypted prices probably follow the cleartext price distribution.
However, encryption provides also condentiality to the bidding
strategy. us, possible use of encryption in charge prices may be
also a sign of a higher value that the bidder wants to hide: aggres-
sive re-targeting because of user’s previous incomplete purchases,
targeting users with higher spending habits, or users with special-
ized needs (e.g., sensitive products, expensive drugs, etc.). Hence, a
bidder (e.g. a DSP) may choose encryption to reduce transparency
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Figure 4: High level overview of our method. e user deploys
YourAdValue on her device, which calculates in real-time the total
cost paid for her by advertisers. In case of encrypted prices, it ap-
plies a decision tree model derived from the PME.
over its bidding strategies, or possible special knowledge it may
have about a specic user, thus preventing an external observer or
competitor from assessing its bidding methods and ad-campaigns.
We should note that encryption is not a feature that comes for
free. ere are signicant costs for the participating parties such
as more computation and storage overhead, energy consumption
and higher imposed latency. erefore, these costs alone could be
a reason for an ADX to charge more for providing the benets of
encryption to a DSP. Considering all the aforementioned, in our
study, we remove the need for making any assumptions regard-
ing encrypted prices and allows us to account for any potential
dierences between cleartext and encrypted prices.
2.4 Encrypted prices on the rise
Encryption is a regular practice in desktop RTB ads (∼68% as re-
ported in [61] with major supporters being DoubleClick, Rubicon-
Project and OpenX). By analyzing aweblog of 1600 real mobile users
(see Section 4), we detected a smaller portion in mobile RTB ads
(∼26%). However, we found that the percentage of ADX-DSP pairs
using encrypted price nURLs was steadily increasing through time
(Figure 2), which means that more and more mobile advertising
entities have started using nURLs with encrypted prices.
In fact, we found that the mobile advertising entities with the
larger RTB shares deliver the highest portion of cleartext prices as
well (Figure 3). For example, MoPub and Adnxs, the two leading
ad-entities in our dataset, are responsible for 33.55% and 10.74% of
the overall RTB ads detected, respectively (x-axis). ey are also
responsible for 45.40% and 5.45% for the cleartext prices detected,
respectively (cumulatively in y-axis). If these two (or more) com-
panies ipped their strategy from cleartext to encrypted, it would
dramatically impact the RTB-ecosystem’s transparency and hinder
price information exposed to an external auditor or the involved
user.
Given these trends in mobile and desktop, we expect that in the
near future RTB auctions will dominate, and many of the ad-entities
will use encryption to deliver their charge prices. Our methodology
anticipates these trends and promotes beer transparency in online
advertising and usage of user personal data. is methodology al-
lows end-users to accurately estimate on their browser, at real-time,
Notation Denition
Vu Total cost of user u
Cu , Eu Sum of cleartext, encrypted prices of user u
SCu , SEu Set of cleartext, encrypted price nURLs of user u
Fi Vector of features for a price nURL i
Si ⊆ Fi Core features selected to represent nURL i
ESe(Si ) Estimated encrypted price based on vector
of features S of price nURL i
Table 2: Summary of notations.
their average ad-related cumulative cost, even when the charge
prices are encrypted.
3 METHODOLOGY
In this section, we describe our proposed methodology, with which
a user u can estimate in real-time the accumulated cost Vu for the
ads she was delivered while browsing the web (§ 3.1) (notations
used are summarized in Table 2). Following this methodology, we
design our system based on twomain components: (i) a remote Price
Modeling Engine (§ 3.2) and (ii) a user-side tool, namely YourAdValue
(§ 3.3). Figure 4 presents an overview of our proposed methodology.
3.1 Overall cost of the user’s data
e overall ad-cost of the user for time periodT is the sum of charge
prices the advertisers have paid aer evaluating her personal data
they have collected and delivering ads to her device. Specically,
this overall value is the sum of both her cleartext Cu (T ) and en-
crypted Eu (T ) prices and can be stated as:
Vu (T ) = Cu (T ) + Eu (T ) (1)
e cleartext prices of a user can be aggregated in a straightforward
fashion, thus producing the ad-cost for user u over such prices:
Cu (T ) =
∑
i
ci , where i ∈ SCu (T ) (2)
On the other hand, the calculation of the aggregated Eu (T ) of
the encrypted prices for the same user is not easy. e actual price
values ei are hidden and therefore need to be estimated. To achieve
that, we leverage the metadata of each charge price in the user’s
set SEu (T) of encrypted price notications. Such metadata may
include: time of day, day of week, size of ad, DSP/ADX involved,
location, type of device, associated IAB, type of OS, user’s interests,
etc. All these metadata are collected in a feature vector Fi that
captures the context of a specic charge price ei in nURLi .
In order to estimate each encrypted notication price i , we built a
machine learning model, which receives as input the feature vector
Fi (or a subset Si ⊆ Fi ), extracted from the nURLi , and estimates
a charge price ESe(Si ) for the encrypted price ei . is permits us
then to aggregate the estimated encrypted prices for user u as we
have done for the cleartext ones:
Eu (T ) =
∑
i
ESe(Si ), where i ∈ SEu (T ) (3)
3.2 Price Modeling Engine
e core element of our solution, the Price Modeling Engine (PME),
is a centralized repository responsible for the estimation of en-
crypted prices. To achieve this, the PME requires a sample of
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Metric D A1 A2
Time period 12 months 13 days 8 days
Impressions 78560 632667 318964
RTB publishers ∼5.6k/month ∼0.2k ∼0.3k
IAB categories 18 16 7
Users 1594 - -
Table 3: Summary of dataset and ad-campaigns.
charge price data and associated features to train a machine learn-
ing model. is component is designed to incorporate data such
as oine weblogs (see Section 4), or online anonymous contribu-
tions (anonymized features and charge prices) from participating
users, similarly to other systems that depend on crowd-sourcing
(e.g., Floodwatch [76]). Using such data, the PME can re-train the
computed model at any time. To assess the dierence between clear-
text and encrypted price distributions in the wild and ne-tune
the training model, the PME runs small “probing ad-campaigns” to
collect ground truth of real charge prices from both encrypted and
cleartext formats.
Feeding the PME with all possible metadata available, i.e. auc-
tions’ metadata and users’ personal data, is clearly not practical.
ere exist hundreds of data points per individual price. Passing
all of them to the modeling engine would make the computational
cost excessive. Additionally, if all data points were to be used in
the probing ad-campaigns, they would render such campaigns too
expensive for their purpose. In order to run eective and ecient
ad-campaigns, and allow the training of a price model without high
computation overhead, the PME performs careful dimensionality
reduction on the extracted metadata (F ) to derive a subset S ⊆ F of
core features capable to capture the value of an impression. is
dimensionality reduction makes the probing ad-campaigns feasible
by reducing by many orders of magnitude the needed features of
each testing setup, and eectively the number of setups to be tested
(see Section 5).
Using the collected ground truth of encrypted prices from ad-
campaigns, the PME trains a machine learning model M to infer
encrypted prices based on their associated subset of features S .
en, each user can apply the modelM (in the form of a decision
tree) locally on their device to estimate each of her encrypted charge
prices based on the matching metadata S .
In case the availability of cleartext prices is limited, the reduc-
tion step to identify important features could be hindered, but
not obstructed. To mitigate this, the PME can run more probing
ad-campaigns to cover extra features found in users’ anonymous
contributions, or that are available in professional ad-campaign
planners (as in FDVT [14]). en, the most important features can
be selected based on their contribution to model the encrypted
prices extracted from these campaigns.
3.3 YourAdValue
YourAdValue is a user-side tool responsible for monitoring the
user’s nURLs and calculating locally the cumulative cost paid for
her in real-time. To achieve this, it lters nURLs from her network
trac and extracts (i) the RTB auction’s charge prices (both en-
crypted and cleartext), and (ii) metadata from each specic auction
(e.g. time of day, day of week, size of ad, involved DSP and ADX,
Type Feature
Geo-temporal
Time of day, Day of week
Location of user based on IP, # of unique locations of
the user, location history
User
Interest categories of the user, Type of mobile device, #
of total web beacons detected for the user, # of cookie
syncs detected of the user up to now, # of publishers
visited by the user, # of total bytes consumed by the
user,
Avg. number of reqs per user for the advertiser, # of
HTTP reqs of the user, Avg. number of bytes per req of
user, Total duration of reqs of the user, Avg. duration
per req of the user
Ad
Size of ad, ADX of nURL, DSP of nURL, IAB category
of the publisher, popularity of particular ad-campaign,
# of total HTTP reqs of the advertiser, # of bytes of
HTTP req, Avg. duration of the reqs for the advertiser,
# of URL parameters, Number of total bytes delivered
for the advertiser
Table 4: Features extracted by summarizing data from parameters
embedded in each price notication detected in the dataset for users
and advertisers.
etc.) along with the personal data the user leaks while using on-
line services (e.g. location, type of device and browser, type of OS,
browsing history, etc.).
As we mentioned earlier, cleartext prices can be aggregated di-
rectly, but encrypted prices must be estimated. erefore, YourAd-
Value retrieves from the PME a model M(Si ) that (i) includes the
features Si that need to be extracted from the collected metadata,
and (ii) provides a decision tree for the estimation of an encrypted
price based on these features.
Using this model, YourAdValue can estimate locally on the client
side, the value ESe(Si ) of the encrypted charge prices based on the
features Si of the given nURL. Aer estimating each encrypted
price, YourAdValue presents to the user the calculated sums Cu (T )
and Eu (T ) along with relevant statistics and the total amountVu (T )
paid by advertisers (see Section 6).
YourAdValue can be implemented in the same manner, either as
a browser extension for desktops or as a module for mobile devices.
In the laer case, YourAdValue can monitor trac of both browsers
and apps similar to existing approaches [64]. For simplicity, in this
work we design YourAdValue as a browser extension; its mobile
counterpart is part of our future work.
Our tool, built as an extension for Chrome browser, monitors
both HTTP and HTTPS trac of the user and detects the RTB
nURLs. Additionally, it stores in the browser’s local storage the
ltered charge prices, the personal and auctions metadata and the
estimation of the encrypted prices. e extension, through toolbar
notications, informs the user about newly detected RTB charge
prices. Upon request, it reports the cumulative cost along with the
previous individual charge prices. Finally, the extension periodically
issues requests to PME to check for new versions of the model.
4 BOOTSTRAPPING PME
We assess the feasibility and eectiveness of our methodology by
bootstrapping the PME to train our model on real data by collecting
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a year long dataset containing weblogs from 1594 volunteering mo-
bile users from the same country. Our users agreed to use a server
of our control as a proxy, allowing us to monitor their outgoing
HTTP trac.2 As a result, we were able to collect a large dataset
D of 373M HTTP requests spanning the entire year of 2015. Note
that though our dataset consists of HTTP-only trac, in principle
our approach works with HTTPS as well, using as input the users’
contributed data as can be seen in Figure 4. Table 3 presents a
summary of our dataset D. Next, we present the data collection
and analysis to extract features used in the price modeling and
ad-campaign planning.
4.1 Dataset analysis
Weblog Ads Analyzer. To process our dataset, we implemented a
weblog advertisements analyzer, capable of detecting and extracting
RTB-related ad trac. First, the analyzer uses a trac classication
module to categorize HTTP requests based on an integrated black-
list of the popular browser adblocker Disconnect [15].3 Using this
blacklist, the analyzer categorizes domains in 5 groups based on the
content they deliver: (i) Advertising, (ii) Analytics, (iii) Social, (iv)
3rd party content, (v) Rest. It consequently applies a second-level
ltering on the advertising trac by parsing each URL for any
RTB-related parameters (like nURL). e analyzer detects nURLs
by applying paern matching against a list of macros we collected
aer (i) manual inspection and past papers [53, 62], and (ii) studying
the existing RTB APIs [25, 35, 56, 63, 69] used by the current domi-
nant advertising companies. From these detected nURLs, it extracts
the charge prices which we assume in this study that are in US
2Data were treated anonymously although users signed a consent form allowing us to
collect and analyze their data.
3Our analyzer can also integrate more than one blacklists (e.g., Adblock Plus’ Easylist,
Ghostery’s blacklist, etc.)
dollars4 paid by the winning bidders, aer ltering out any bidding
prices that may co-exist in each nURL. It also extracts additional
ad-related parameters such as ad impression ID, bidder’s name, ad
campaign ID, auction’s ad-slot size, carrier, etc.
Other operations carried out by our analyzer include: (i) user
localization based on reverse IP geo-coding, (ii) separation of mo-
bile web browser and application originated trac based on the
user-agent eld of each HTTP request, (iii) extraction of device-
related aributes from the user-agent eld (type of device, screen
size, OS etc.), (iv) identication of cooperating ADXs - DSPs pairs,
leveraging the nURL used by the ADX to inform the bidder (i.e.
DSP) about its auction win, (v) user interest prole based on web
browsing history.
Feature extraction. DSPs use dierent machine learning algo-
rithms for their decision engines, taking various features as input,
each aecting dierently the bidding price and, consequently, the
charge price of an ad-slot. To identify such important parame-
ters, we extracted several features from the nURLs of our dataset
such as user mobility paerns, temporal features, user interests,
device characteristics, ad-slot sizes, cookie synchronizations [1],
publisher ranking, etc. Next, we present the analysis of the most
interesting features (Table 4 presents a summary). We group them
into 3 categories: geo-temporal state of the auction (§ 4.2), user’s
characteristics (§ 4.3), and ad-related (§ 4.4).
4.2 Geo-temporal features
An important parameter that aects the price of an RTB ad is the
user’s current location [31], information which is broadly avail-
able to publishers and trackers. us, in our dataset we extract
user IP address and using the publicly accessible MaxMind geoIP
4Given that the majority of ADXs are located in US and following previous works [62],
we assume every charge price to be in US Dollars (so 1CPM =1/1000 impressions).
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database [54], we map each IP to its city level. In Figure 5, which
presents the 5th, 10th, 50th, 90th and 95th percentile of the charge
prices, we see that although the median values are relatively lower
in large cities, the uctuation of their price values is higher.
Another important feature is time, and specically the time of
day and day of week. is is important due to the dierent level
of aention a user may give to an ad impression and the amount
of time she has to purchase an advertised product (e.g., working
hours vs. aernoon’s free time, or weekdays vs. weekends). In
Figure 6, although the median charge prices are of similar range,
we see that the early morning hours until noon tend to have more
charge prices with increased values. In Figure 7, we see a periodic
phenomenon, where although in median values the charge prices
are quite close, duringweekdays themax prices are relatively higher
than on weekends.5
4.3 User-related features
Device type. By parsing the user-agent (UA) header information,
our analyzer classies trac and inspects the dierent ngerprints
the UA leaks (specications of process virtual machine (e.g., Dalvik
or ART) or kernel (e.g., Darwin), operating system, browser vendor
etc.) us, we are able to identify the type of device (PC or mo-
bile), the dierent types of mobile operating systems (Android, iOS,
Windows) and if the trac was generated from a mobile app or a
mobile web browser.
In Figure 8, we see the percentage of RTB trac for the dierent
OSes over time. As expected, Android and iOS dominate, owning
5For time-of-day and day-of-week distributions, which visually appear to be similar, we
conrmed that they are, in fact, statistically dierent with non-parametric, two-sample
Kolmorogov-Smirno tests at p-value levels of ptod<0.0002 and pdow<0.002.
the larger portions of the market through the entire year, with
Android-based devices appearing in 2x times more RTB auctions.
However, when normalizing this RTB share per mobile OS (Fig-
ure 9), we nd that Android and iOS devices are delivered mostly
equal RTB impressions, with some months Android surpassing iOS
and vice-versa. en, we extract the trac originated from the most
popular ad-entity, MoPub [57], and analyze the charge prices of the
impressions rendered in the dierent OSes. Surprisingly, although
Android-based devices are more popular, we see in Figure 10 that
iOS-based devices tend to receive higher RTB prices, in median
values.
Inference of the user’s interest. e browsing history of a user
is used by the advertising ecosystem as a proxy of her interests. By
monitoring the websites a user visits through time, a tracker can
infer her interests, political or sexual preferences, hobbies, etc., quite
accurately [7]. To enrich our set of features with the users’ interests,
we collect all the websites each user visits across her whole network
activity. Such information is available to the RTB ecosystem as
well, by using cookie synchronization [1] or web beacons [34]. To
extract the interests from the visited websites, similar to existing
approaches [3], we retrieve the associated categories of content
for each website according to Google AdWords [27]. en, we
aggregate across groups of categories for each user and get the
nal weighted group of interests for each user in the form of IAB
categories [37]. Figure 11 presents for the top mobile ADX (MoPub)
a distribution of the generated ad revenue for the dierent IAB
content categories in a 2 month subset of our dataset. As expected,
not all IAB categories cost the same. Indeed, there are categories
that are associated with products which aract higher bid prices
in auctions, like IAB-3 (Business & Marketing), with an average
charge price of up to 5 CPM for the 50% of the cases. Alternatively,
there are categories like IAB-15 (Science), which are unable to draw
prices higher than 0.2 CPM for the 50% of the cases.
4.4 Ad-related features
Web Vs. Apps Advertisers bid for ad-space in both webpages and
mobile apps. Aer studying the cost per ad in both counterparts in
our dataset, we see that apps draw on average 2.6× higher prices
(0.712 CPM vs. 0.273 CPM). is is expected; studies have shown
that more advertising budget is spent on mobile application ads
instead of mobile web, driving higher prices per ad [58]: (i) Users
pay more aention to app ads as they typically occupy xed places
in the screen, with no opportunity to scroll them out of sight as in
web ads. In addition, (ii) studies [64] have shown that apps leak
more personal data to advertisers, enabling them to deliver more
targeted ads.
Ad-slot sizes. Some ad-entities carry in their nURLs a parameter
with the size of the auctioned ad-slot. In Figure 12 we plot the
popularity of each of the ad-slot sizes through time. It’s interesting
to see that 300x250 ad-slots (known as “MPUs” or “Medium Rect-
angles”) dominate the dataset from May’15 on, taking the place of
320x50 ad-slots (known as “large mobile banners”). In fact, 300x250
ad-slots have more ad content available from advertisers, so they
can increase earnings when both text and image ads are enabled. In
addition, we see that the 728x90 ad-slot (“leaderboard” or “banner”)
IMC ’17, November 1–3, 2017, London, United Kingdom Panagiotis Papadopoulos et al.
is also popular. is ad-slot, usually placed at the top of a page, is
seen by users immediately upon page load.
It is easy to anticipate, that the more space an ad-slot covers
in the user’s display, the higher the price will be. To verify this
intuition, we isolated the trac of an ad-entity (i.e. Turn [18]),
which carries the ad-slot size in its nURLs along with the associated
charge prices. Surprisingly, in Figure 13, we see that this intuition
is wrong since the most expensive ad-slots for an advertiser are
in fact, not the largest ones. In our dataset, we see that the two
most expensive ad-slots are the MPU (300x250) and Monster MPU
(300x600), with median prices of 0.47 and 0.39 CPM, respectively.
However, from Figure 14, the increased popularity of MPU and
Leaderboard ad-slots, allows them to accumulate 64.3% and 20.6%
of the total RTB revenue of Turn in our dataset, respectively. Finally,
it is worth to note that our results verify past resources [16, 24]
regarding the more expensive ad-slots.
4.5 Summary
In summary, by analyzing the features extracted from our oine
dataset, we nd that a user’s location (at city level) aects the
median price that advertisers pay as well as its variability. How-
ever, such price dierences are expected to be more evident at the
country-level, as shown in [62]. In addition, the days and hours
that a user may not be busy (Sundays), or may oer more aention
(e.g., early mornings, Mondays) lead to higher charge prices. e
type of user’s device also aects the charge prices but in a rather
contradicting fashion: though there are more Android devices, iOS-
based devices draw higher median prices. As expected, the total
revenue per category of user interest (through IABs) varies a lot,
with some IABs being more costly than others. Finally, the display’s
real-estate occupied by an ad-slot does not correlate well with price.
In fact, larger ad-slot sizes do not mean higher prices. As shown in
the next section, these extracted features are used to plan eective
ad-campaigns and model encrypted charge prices.
5 CHARGE PRICE ESTIMATION
In order to create a model that estimates the encrypted prices de-
tected on the user’s browser and computes the total cost advertisers
pay for her personal data, we need to have ground truth on charge
encrypted prices. However, such dataset is not easy to acquire. One
way to obtain this information is to collaborate directly with an
ADX that sends such encrypted prices.6 We assume this to be the
rare case, since ADXs are generally unwilling to share such kind of
data that may reveal bidding strategies and revenues.
In order to collect ground-truth data on encrypted prices, our
system conducts small probing ad-campaigns on ADX(s)-DSP pairs
that encrypt the winning prices. Such ad-campaigns can be de-
signed and executed with the help of a single or few DSPs, with
lile overhead and a small budget of a few hundred dollars. In
addition, they can be optimized by using a specic set of experi-
mental setups, which cover all possible scenarios from the small
parameter vector S to be kept short, ecient and cheap. Given that
the prices do not change drastically over time, these campaigns can
be executed every few months to collect probing data for time-shi
6We considered top ADXs for encrypted prices (DoubleClick, OpenX, RubiconProject,
PulsePoint), and ADXs for cleartext prices like MoPub (top mobile ADX).
correction and increased coverage of more ADXs. Besides, they can
be automated and re-launched as frequently as needed, e.g., every
few months or when the detected cleartext prices deviate from
historical data. Having such campaigns launched from a specic
location allows for more accurate and cost ecient price modeling
that can be shared across all participating platform users in the
same area or country.
We envision that such campaigns can be crowd-funded (like
Tor Project [77], Wikipedia, WiGLE [10], etc.), thus, contributing
to an independent and sustainable platform that can scale beer
across users, countries, and ADXs covered. One may argue that
these probing campaigns could pollute users’ browsing with non-
useful ad impressions. us, they need to comply with the current
standards, and if possible, consider an actual product or service. Of
course, ADXs could in principle ght back and try to identify and
block such campaigns, but their huge clientele combined with the
low volume of such campaigns makes the detection very dicult.
Next, we describe the eort to select a subset of core features
important for price modeling (§ 5.1) and how they allow us to design
ecient and eective ad-campaigns (§ 5.2). en, we provide an
analysis of the data collected by two such campaigns (§ 5.3) and we
describe the model that estimates encrypted prices, which can be
used by end-users (§ 5.4).
5.1 Dimensionality reduction of features
e cost of testing all possible combinations of parameters and
their values from the available feature set F (with one probing ad-
campaign each), would constitute the budget for the ad-campaigns
impossible (1000s of setups x 10s Euros/setup). erefore, to per-
form ad-campaigns that are both eective and cost ecient, we
need to select a subset of features S ⊆ F that best describe the RTB
prices found in weblogs such as the historic dataset D. is subset
of features should explain as much of the variability of prices as
possible. Assuming both encrypted and cleartext prices are aected
by the same set of important features, this set should be small. e
fewer features we select as important, the smaller the cost of run-
ning ad-campaigns to collect representative RTB prices using these
features (e.g., 10s-100s of setups).
To achieve this selection, we performed dimensionality reduc-
tion using all the available features (288) described in Section 4
and Table 4, using the cleartext prices as the target variable for
optimization. Some of these features are dense, i.e., they have an
actual value in each price (e.g., time of day, day of week, size of
ad, etc.) and others are sparse (e.g., interest categories of the user
through time, publishers visited by user through time, etc.). First,
for normalization, we applied a log transformation on the extracted
cleartext prices found in D. en, we applied a clustering of the
prices into 4 classes, using an unsupervised equidistance model
that nds the optimal splits between given prices using a method of
leave-one-out estimate of the entropy of values in each class. Next,
we ltered out features that did not vary at all (i.e., constants) or
had very high variance (99%) (i.e., likely to be noise).
As a nal step, dimensionality reduction (or feature selection)
techniques such as PCA or Random Forests (RF) can be used [44].
We chose the RF model7 because it takes into account the target
7An ensemble of decision trees built using a random subset from the available features.
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Filter name Range of values (type)
Cities Madrid, Barcelona, Valencia, Seville
Type of interaction Mobile in-app, Mobile web
Time of day 12am-9am, 9am-6pm, 6pm-12am
Day of week Weekday, Weekend
Type of device Smartphone, Tablet
Type of OS iOS, Android
Ad-format (smartphone) 320x50, 300x250, 320x480 or 480x320
Ad-format (tablet) 728x90, 300x250, 768x1024 or 1024x768
Ad-exchange MoPub, OpenX, Rubicon, DoubleClick,
PulsePoint
Categories of targeting all IABs possible
Table 5: Basic lters used in controlled ad-campaigns in Spain. In
total, 144 experimental setups were attempted.
variable (cleartext price), it can be trained quickly on large datasets,
it maintains interpretability of features and generally does not
overt the given data. In case the availability of cleartext prices is
limited, the reduction step to identify important features to be used
in ad-campaigns could be hindered. To mitigate this, the PME can
use intermediate techniques such as high correlation lters that do
not require a target variable, to eliminate features carrying similar
information.
We trained various RF models using subsets of semantically
related features from the available feature set and the best features
from each subset were selected based on their power to describe the
cleartext price distribution. In summary, we grouped features in the
following sets: A) time, B) hp-related, C) advertisement-related,
D) DSP-related, E) publisher/host interests, F) user hp statistics
(historical), G) user interests (historical), and H) user locations
(historical). We also tried selecting representative features out of
each set to create minimal combinations covering all aspects of the
hp-available information.
In total, we tried tens of feature subsets and combinations and
evaluated them using standard machine learning metrics such as
precision, recall, weighted area under the receiver operating char-
acteristic curve (AUCROC) and out-of-bag error. Dimensionality
reduction could, in principle, lead to loss of accuracy in the eort to
explain price classes. However, our experimentation lead to a small
subset of features with minimal loss of precision (< 2%) and recall
(< 6%). In fact, we conclude that an optimal subset that performs
very well and is small enough to allow cost ecient ad-campaigns
is a set that combines features from dierent groups. In particular,
also conrmed with an ad-campaign expert, we select the following
features to be used for the probing ad-campaigns described next:
S={application/web-browsing, device type, user location, time of
day, day of week, ad format (size), type of website, ad-exchange}.
5.2 Ad-campaigns setup
Using the most important parameters extracted in set S , we con-
struct various experimental setups s ∈ S ⊆ F that can be used
to deploy such ad-campaigns over a short period of time T ′ in se-
lected ADXs to match top ADXs found in D. ese setups combine
dierent values of control variables that are important for an ad-
campaign:<user location, web-interaction type, time of day, day
of week, device type, OS, ad-size, ADX>. For example, an exper-
imental setup could be this: <Madrid, app, 12am-9am, weekday,
smartphone, iOS, 320x50, MoPub> (144 setups, Table 5). Clearly,
using more features would increase coverage of dierent types of
ads, but also the campaigns’ cost. Instead, by running controlled
ad-campaigns with a small feature set, we can receive ground truth
data about encrypted prices, thereby allowing us to train a model
for such prices, in a reasonable ad-campaign cost.
Campaigns with ADXs that deliver cleartext prices also allow us
to compare prices in dierent times and compute shis in the price
distribution due to time passed between the collection of dataset
D and present time. To compensate for the loss of information
from cleartext prices becoming less abundant, additional features
available in professional ad-campaign planners (as in FDVT [14])
could be used in the future to enhance the setups tested. With the
results of these campaigns (in essence, charge prices for RTB ads
that full a given setup s), the PME can train a model to estimate
the cost of new ads with a given setup s ′ close, or equal, to one
tested, i.e. s ′ ∼ s ∈ S .
Number of required ad-campaigns. An important decision in
running probing campaigns is how many of them to launch, and
with how many impressions in each one, in order to obtain a good
approximation of the underlying distribution of prices. For this, we
analyzed the ad-campaigns found for MoPub in D. We identied
280 such campaigns in 2015, with mean and standard deviation
of charge price of m = 1.84 and std = 2.15 CPM, respectively.
We use the process described in [39] and the next formulation to
compute d , the expected error on the mean, assuming a suggested
number of setups n, and ignoring the nite population correction
adjustment (thus assuming a more conservative approximation of
n) d = Zα /2×std√
n
, where Z is the z-score of normal distribution.
Using the 144 setups proposed, we can approximate to more than
95% CI (i.e., α=0.05) the mean price of campaigns observed in the
wild, assuming a margin of error 0.35 CPM. Also, considering the
distribution of prices within the largest of ad-campaigns detected
for MoPub with 1.8k impressions, we can approximate to 95% CI
the mean price of a campaign, assuming an error 0.1 CPM and
minimum of 185 impressions per campaign.
5.3 Ad-campaigns analysis
Using the above as guideline, we executed two rounds of dierent
ad-campaigns to collect data on prices (Table 3). Our ad-campaigns
advertised a real non-for-prot NGO in the area of data trans-
parency, in an aempt to avoid polluting users with meaningless
impressions, and trying to do something useful with the allocated
budget.
Dataset collected. e rst round (A1) was executed for 2 weeks
in May 2016 and utilized the 4 ADXs mentioned earlier (also found
in D) that encrypt price notications and targeted publishers of
many IAB categories. e second round (A2) was executed with the
same experimental setups as A1 during June 2016, but in this case
the DSP was instructed to use only MoPub, while still targeting
similar IAB categories of publishers. ese constraints allowed us
to directly compare encrypted with cleartext prices in the same
period, and time-shi all prices detected in D from 2015 to 2016.
In both campaigns, the DSP was given an upper bound on the
bidding CPM price to safeguard that the allocated budget will not
be consumed quickly. Because studying the eects of retargeting is
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Figure 15: Comparison of CPMcosts for the dierent IAB categories
in our dataset and the 2 probing ad-campaigns.
beyond the scope of this paper, we did not ask the DSP to perform
such campaigns. However, the DSP was instructed to bid in a
dynamic manner, as low or high as needed to get the minimum
of impressions delivered for the various experimental setups we
requested. We plan to investigate the eects of retargeting in a
separate and dedicated future study. Overall, wemanaged to receive
across all setups, over 600k impressions displayed with encrypted
price notications to more than 200 publishers, and over 300k
impressions with cleartext price notications to more than 300
publishers, reaching audiences of 6 IAB categories common to both
notication types.
Cost paid vs. IAB category. In Figure 15, we compare the over-
lapping IAB categories of the RTB impressions we took from (i) the
set of encrypted prices from the ad-campaign on four ADXs in A1,
(ii) the set of cleartext prices from the ad-campaign on MoPub (A2),
(iii) the 2 months MoPub subset of D. Note that in some cases, the
results from D vary more than in the ad-campaigns. is is to be
expected, as the dataset includes prices from numerous DSP-ADX
pairs for many ad-campaigns running in parallel in the duration of
a year, whereas our two ad-campaigns are more targeted to specic
DSP-ADX pairs.
Regarding the cleartext prices of dierent IAB categories, al-
though the median prices are usually in the same order of magni-
tude, they are higher in the case of the recent ad-campaign contrary
to the 2 month dataset. We believe that this dierence is due to
the time shi between the dataset collected in 2015 and the ad
campaigns performed in 2016. In addition, we see that the median
price is always higher in case of encrypted prices (A1), compared to
the cleartext prices of the second ad-campaign (A2) and dataset D.
5.4 Encrypted price modeling
Using the ground truth data collected from the rst round of ad-
campaigns (encrypted prices) with various parameters within the
subset of features S , we trained a machine learning classier to
predict values of encrypted prices. We note that given the problem
of modeling real values, we rst applied regression models with
dierent combinations of dependent variables (S). However, the
high variability of charge prices lead to low performance (high er-
ror) of the regression models. erefore, we proceeded to split the
prices into groups for classication. As a rst step, we performed
similar preprocessing for the encrypted prices as we did earlier for
the cleartext prices (normalization and clustering to 4 classes of
well balanced groups). Next, we trained a RF model to predict the
class of an encrypted price, based on the available parameters S .
For the training and testing, we applied 10-fold cross validation,
and averaged results over 10 runs. Using features such as city of
user, day of week and the time the ad was delivered, ad size, mo-
bile OS of the user’s device, IAB category of the publisher, ADX
used and device type, our classier can achieve a very good perfor-
mance: TP=82.9%, FP=6.8%, Precision=83.5%, Recall=82.9%, 0.964
AUCROC. ese scores are weighted averages across all classes,
with no class performing worse than 5% from the average. We
repeated this process with more price classes (i.e., 5-10 groups) for
higher granularity of price prediction, but the results with 4 classes
outperformed them.
When the exact publisher used is also taken into account in the
model, the performance of the classier increases to 95% accuracy,
and 0.99 AUCROC. However, this is classic over-ing and we
should caution that the publishers used in the ad-campaigns are
just a subset of the thousands of possible publishers that can be
found in real weblogs. erefore, we chose to use the model with
the IAB category but without the exact publisher as part of its
input features. Next, this model was used for the estimation of the
encrypted prices of nURLs found in the weblogs of each user in D,
given the matching parameter values from S ⊆ F .
6 USER COST FOR ADVERTISERS
e previous sections allowed us to: (1) bootstrap our price model-
ing engine from existing user weblogs, so that we nd the important
features describing well the observed RTB cleartext prices, (2) using
these important features, run probing ad-campaigns with ADXs
that send encrypted price notications, so that we collect ground
truth on such prices from performance reports delivered to us, (3)
using such ground truth, train a machine learning model to estimate
the price of new RTB notications sent in encrypted form. We are
now ready to study the overall cost advertisers paid for each of the
users in our dataset D, who received cleartext and/or encrypted
prices in nURLs of delivered ads.
6.1 Encrypted vs. cleartext price distributions
e work in [62] assumed that encrypted prices follow the same
distribution with cleartext prices. To examine the validity of such
assumption, we plot the distributions of both encrypted and cleart-
ext charge prices we got from the two ad-campaigns we performed.
Interestingly, from Figure 16, the distribution of encrypted prices in
A1 is distinctly dierent and of higher median value (∼1.7×) than
cleartext prices of A2.
In addition, we study the distributions between dierent time
periods and ADXs to extract important lessons. First, we see that
the cleartext price distribution of MoPub (2015) is similar to all
ADXs sending cleartext prices, either when considering a 2 month
period or a full year. Hence, we can studyMoPub as a representative
example and extrapolate lessons for the rest of the ADXs that send
cleartext prices. Second, the distribution of cleartext prices fromA2
(MoPub) are of higher median value and can be used to establish
the price shi due to time dierence between the timeT the dataset
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Figure 16: Comparison of price distributions between cleartext and
encrypted, for dierent time periods and datasets (D vs.A1 andA2).
was collected, andT ′ when the campaigns were executed. In reality,
this price shi can be detected evenly across multiple probing ad-
campaigns (e.g., once per quarter of year).
6.2 How much do advertisers pay
to reach a user?
Equippedwith our presentedmethodology for estimating encrypted
prices, we are now ready to respond to our motivating question.
Specically, we utilize our method and compute the overall cost
advertisers paid for each user in the dataset D, i.e., across a whole
year of mobile web transactions. We also apply a time-correction
coecient on the cleartext prices using the prices from the second
round of ad-campaigns. is allows us to consider the increase in
cleartext prices due to time dierence from the weblog collection
(2015) and the ad-campaigns execution (2016).
Figure 17 presents these cumulative costs in the form of CDFs of
the price distributions. As expected, we observe that the cumulative
cost due to encrypted prices is still not surpassing the cleartext,
since the laer is still the dominant price delivery mechanism in
mobile RTB. We also note that some users are more costly than
others. Specically, the median user costs ∼25 CPM, and up to 73%
of the users cost < 100 CPM through the year for the mobile ad
ecosystem in the given dataset. is means that the ad-ecosystem
reaches the average user very cheaply and multiple times below
what users estimate this cost to be (e.g.,10s of dollars [11]).
On the other hand, for ∼ 2% of users, the advertising ecosystem
spent 1000-10000 CPM for the same time period. Finally, about 60%
of users had an increased average cumulative cost of ∼ 55% on top
of their cleartext cost, due to the estimated encrypted prices. ese
users had a median of 14.3 CPM added to their total cost, with some
extreme cases of 1000-5000 CPM.
In the previous result, we compared the distributions of en-
crypted and cleartext prices, while disregarding the targeted user.
In order to identify if the cost paid through encrypted prices is the
same with cleartext for a specic user, we compare for each user
the total costs in Figure 18 and average cost per impression in Fig-
ure 19, for each type of price. We observe that a signicant portion
of users (∼20-25%) cost similarly for ads embedded with encrypted
or cleartext prices. As expected, due to the current majority of
cleartext prices in the mobile ad market, a large portion of users
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Figure 17: Cumulative CPM paid per user in our year long dataset.
(∼75%) have higher cumulative cost from cleartext than encrypted
prices. However, a small portion (∼2%) costs more (2-32×) in en-
crypted than in cleartext form, because they were delivered mostly
ads with encrypted prices. When we normalize the cumulative ad
cost of user per impression delivered (Figure 19), we nd that for
small prices of ≤3 CPM/impression, cleartext is more dominant
across users. We also nd a small portion (∼2%) of users who cost
up to 5× more CPM/impression for the delivered ads in encrypted
than in cleartext form. We anticipate this portion to increase as
the encrypted notication becomes the dominant delivery of RTB
prices in mobile.
6.3 Summary
By studying the overall RTB advertising cost for users in our dataset,
and distinguishing the encrypted from the cleartext prices, we found
that the basic assumption of related work [62] that encrypted and
cleartext prices are similar, is not valid (encrypted prices are around
1.7× higher). Furthermore, advertisers, based on users’ personal
data, paid ∼25 CPM for delivering ads to an average user, and less
than ∼100 CPM for delivering ads to 3/4 of users during a year. We
also identied a small portion of outlier users (∼2%) who cost 10-
100×more to the ad-ecosystem than the average user, and a similar
portion that costs up to 32×more in encrypted than cleartext prices,
even though encrypted prices are only a quarter of the mobile RTB
ecosystem.
Validation. As an eort to validate our methodology, we can ex-
trapolate how much users cost for the ad-ecosystem and if this
estimation compares with current market numbers. For this extrap-
olation, we make some assumptions on how our dataset represents
the overall ecosystem of users and advertisers. In particular, we
assume that our average mobile user, whose annual ad-cost is in the
8-102 CPM range (25th-75th perc.), has: (1) performed 2.65 hours
online daily, which is ∼83% of the average daily mobile internet
usage, when considering average tablet and other mobile device
usage [50], (2) performed internet activity from both mobile and
laptop/desktop devices, the former trac type being ∼51% of to-
tal internet time [12], (3) received ads in a similar fashion in both
HTTP and HTTPS, the former being ∼40% of the total trac de-
livered to a user [20, 72], (4) received ads over RTB, which has an
overhead management and intermediaries cost of ∼55% [68], and
(5) received ads in a similar fashion over RTB and traditional and
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Figure 18: Total cleartext vs. total estimated encrypted cost of each
user in D (color indicates number of users).
other online advertising, the former being ∼20% of the total online
advertising [36]. Considering these factors, the overall average user
ad-cost (25th-75th perc.) would be in the range of $0.54-6.85, which
is in the order of magnitude reported by major online advertising
platforms such as Twier (owner of MoPub, ARPU: $7-8 [30]) and
Facebook (ARPU: $14-17 [13]) during the period 2015-2016.
7 RELATEDWORK
ere is a plethora of papers studying privacy loss and tracking
techniques in the wild [1, 17, 21, 48, 52, 60, 71]. ere are also
others proposing privacy preserving countermeasures based on
either (i) randomization-/obfuscation- based techniques [59, 65],
where the authors aim to pollute the information trackers retrieve
in order to hide the users’ data and interests, or (ii) anti-tracking
mechanisms [47, 64], where requests to trackers are avoided or
blocked. All the above studies, highlight the voracity of web entities
to collect data about the user and her online behavior, and an arms
race between the privacy-aware users and trackers.
But how do all these trackers monetize from these data? e
answer is in the advertising ecosystem, where advertisers are pur-
chasing audiences to deliver their ad-impressions. erefore, there
are studies focusing solely on privacy preservation in the adver-
tising ecosystem. For example, Privad [32] is designed to conceal
user activities from an ad-network, by interposing an anonymizing
proxy between the browser and the ad-network, allowing a trusted
client soware to select relevant ads locally. Unfortunately, it re-
quires broad adoption of high-performance anonymizing proxies.
Alternatively, Adnostic [78] is an architecture for interest-targeted
advertising without tracking. Like Privad, Adnostic uses client-
based functionality to perform ad selection, but eliminates anonymiz-
ing proxies at the cost of less precise ad targeting. In [66], authors
propose obfuscation of the user’s full identity while browsing the
web. is was achieved by introducing Web Identity Translator
(WIT) in-between the user’s client and the visited websites. Given
that advertisers are interested in adjusting their buying strategy
at real time, it is unclear if such approaches can be adapted to
contemporary technologies such as RTB auctions.
e economics of private data have long been an interesting
topic and aracted a considerable body of research either from the
user’s perspective [2, 11, 70, 74], or the advertiser’s perspective [14,
19, 22, 62]. In [2] authors discuss the value of privacy aer dening
two concepts (i) Willingness To Pay: the monetary amount users
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Figure 19: Average cleartext vs. average estimated encrypted price
per impression of each user in D .
are willing to pay to protect their privacy, and (ii) Willingness
To Accept: the compensation that users are willing to accept for
their privacy loss. In two user-studies [11, 74] authors measure
how much users value their own oine and online personal data,
and consequently how much they would sell them to advertisers.
In [70], the authors propose “transactional” privacy to allow users
to decide what personal information can be released and receive
compensation from selling them.
In [62], the authors perform an analysis of cookie matching in
association with the RTB advertising. Similar to our approach, they
leverage the RTB nURL to observe the charge prices and they con-
duct a basic study to provide some insights into these prices, by
analyzing dierent user proles and visiting contexts. eir results
conrm that when the users’ browsing histories are leaked, the
charge prices tend to be increased. Similarly, in [61], the authors
propose a transparency enhancing tool showing to the users the
RTB charge price every time a RTB auction is performed. Further-
more, they collect proled and un-proled data from a browser
extension and a crawler respectively, and they compare the RTB
prices, the bidding frequency and the inter-relations among ADXs
and DSPs. Contrary to our work, both studies use a dataset from (i)
a small number of 100 users, (ii) over desktop, (iii) covering only one
month, (iv) and based on these data, they estimate the advertising
total revenues using only the cleartext prices based on the arbitrary
assumption that encrypted and cleartext prices follow the same
distributions. Although their results regarding the average prices
per ad are comparable to ours (∼0.5CPM Vs. ∼0.26CPM), they are
not equal since their study was conducted on desktop and in 2013,
when ad spending in desktop was higher than in mobile [12].
In [22], authors use a dataset of users’ HTTP traces and provide
rough estimates of the relative value of users by leveraging the
suggested bid amounts for the visited websites, based on categories
provided by the Google AdWords. FDTV [14] is a plugin to inform
users in real-time about the economic value of the personal infor-
mation associated to their Facebook activity. Although similar to
ours, our approach works for all HTTP activity of mobile users.
Furthermore, journalists from Financial Times, created an inter-
active calculator [19] to explore how valuable specic pieces of
user data are for the ad-companies. is calculator is based on the
analysis of industry pricing data from a range of sources in the US.
Finally, the rapid growth of RTB auctions has drawn the aention
of the research community, which aims to explore the economics
of the RTB ad ecosystem. In [83], the authors provide an insight to
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Figure 20: Preliminary implementation of YourAdValue Chrome extension in use.
pricing and an empirical analysis of the technologies involved. ey
use internal data of an ADX and they study its bidding behaviors
and strategies. In [81], the authors propose a winning price pre-
dicting mechanism by leveraging machine learning and statistical
methods to train a model using the bidding history. eir predict-
ing approach aims to help DSPs ne-tune their bids accordingly.
ough such studies help us understand some internal mechanisms
of ADXs and DSPs, they are not applicable to our seing as we try
to infer the cumulative ad-cost of each user based on user-related
features that are measurable from the user’s device over time.
8 DISCUSSION & CONCLUSION
Limitations. Our approach, through YourAdValue plugin, moni-
tors the charge prices for each auctioned ad-slot. However, there
are several cost models in digital ad-buying. For example, Cost-
Per-Impression is where the advertiser pays when an impression is
rendered, and Cost-Per-Click is where the advertiser pays only if
the impression is rendered and clicked, etc. Given that our study is
based on passive measurements, we currently unable to determine
the cost model of each auctioned ad-slot. erefore, we assume
all charge prices are under the Cost-Per-Impression model, thus
computing the maximum cost advertisers pay for a user.
Computing e nancial worth of individuals. Via our
methodology, users can estimate, at real time, the cost advertis-
ers pay to reach them. However, this work’s important technical
contribution, i.e., how to compute the nancial worth of individu-
als with a passive measurement method has several applications.
Our methodology could provide more transparency on what each
type of the users’ personal data is worth, and allow users to take
advantage of, and (re)negotiate their online value with data hub
companies who are interested in investing and innovating in the
area of targeted advertising. Also, such companies can use our
methodology to assess the costs implied in this area, how to allo-
cated appropriate resources and, even, estimating bidding strategies
of competitors. In addition, regulators and policy makers could pro-
vide guidelines and laws to users and companies for containing the
leakage of users’ personal data. Finally, tax auditors could estimate
ad-companies’ revenues, and detect discrepancies from their tax
declarations in an independent and transparent way.
Conclusion. In this study, we aim to enhance transparency in the
ad ecosystem, where user’s personal data is the most important fac-
tor aecting the pricing dynamics. We developed a rst of its kind
methodology to estimate how much do advertisers pay to reach a
user. Our methodology leverages the rapidly growing RTB proto-
col and the new advertising model of programmatic instantaneous
auctions, where the advertisers evaluate the users’ collected data at
real time and bid for an ad-slot in their display. Our study analyzes
the RTB price notications sent to winning advertising bidders and
focuses on the distinction between cleartext and encrypted price
notications and how to estimate the laer. Towards this end, we
train a model using as ground truth prices obtained by running our
own probing ad-campaigns. We bootstrap and validate our method-
ology using a year long trace of real user browsing data, as well as
two real world ad-campaigns. Finally, we designed YourAdValue: a
system to allow users to compute at real time the value advertisers
pay to reach them. As future work, we plan to make our prototype
(a preliminary version can be seen in Figure 20) available for the
community to test and explore its eectiveness with online users.
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